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“And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core
principle that everybody should have some basic security when it
comes to their health care.”1

INTRODUCTION
If healthcare reform had excluded from its “basic security” cardiac
catheterizations, Caesarian section deliveries, or knee replacement
surgeries from the services to be covered by either public or private
health insurance, the public likely would have been both bewildered

* H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law and
Bioethics Associate, University of Kentucky College of Medicine. Many thanks to
the participants in the Medicaid Matters workshop for their insights and
encouragement, and to Kathryn Swany for her research assistance. Thanks always
DT.
1. President Barack Obama, “On Behalf of My Mother,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Mar. 23, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/23/behalf-mymother (signing statement at the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act).

1357

HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1358

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

7/14/2013 10:40 PM

[Vol. XL

and outraged. It would have been bewildered because the goal of
healthcare reform was to create near-universal insurance coverage to
facilitate equal access to healthcare, and outraged because these
procedures are some of the most frequently performed inpatient
surgical procedures in the United States.2 If access to care was the
goal, then covering the procedures most often performed would seem
to ensure that various populations receive equitable access to care.
Nevertheless, Congress explicitly excluded3 a procedure that current
statistics indicate one in three women of childbearing age will need:
abortion.4 Not even medically necessary abortions, where the fetus is
not viable, or where the pregnant woman’s health is endangered, are
rescued from the pariah designation imposed by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).5
Trading healthcare reform for women’s reproductive health was
not an unexpected occurrence. In 2010, I predicted that Congress was
likely to exclude poor women from the sweeping access to care that
the nascent health reform bill appeared poised to provide.6 The ACA
was an expansive legislative effort that attempted to level the playing
field for healthcare access in the United States; in many areas, the
ACA is likely to succeed.7 But by excluding one of the most common
2. FastStats: Inpatient Surgery, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/insurg.htm (last updated May 30, 2013).
3. See Robert Pear, Negotiating to 60 Votes, Compromise by Compromise, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at A37 (reporting that Senator Harry Reid dropped abortion
coverage from the reform bill to appease Senator Ben Nelson, the anti-abortion
Democrat from Nebraska).
4. CDC’s Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Data_Stats/Abortion.htm
(last updated Nov. 21, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, 784,507 legal abortions were
reported to the CDC). The Guttmacher Institute reports significantly higher
numbers for legal induced abortions (medical and surgical), with the most recent
number being over 1.2 million abortions in 2008. Facts on Induced Abortion in the
United
States,
GUTTMACHER
INST.
1
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
5. See Rachel Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The
Intersection of Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L. J. 983 (2012)
(discussing the “collision course” created by the ACA between genetic testing and
abortion).
6. See Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 783 (noting that Congress was poised to incorporate the Hyde
Amendment into healthcare reform legislation).
7. The “ACA” is two separate laws: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.), which amended multiple
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surgical procedures from its sweep, the ACA has traded women’s
reproductive rights for everyone else’s gain in medical care.8
Despite this compromise, the ACA contains many provisions that
will better women’s health by improving their access to consistent
care and their status in insurance markets.9 Such provisions include
the elimination of preexisting condition clauses,10 prohibitions on
rescission,11 open access to obstetric and gynecologic services,12
required maternity and newborn care,13 and the prohibition of
lifetime caps on insurance coverage.14 These private insurance
strictures will improve the health of women regardless of their
marital, employment, socioeconomic, or other statuses, but especially
women of low economic means who historically have had trouble
accessing consistent healthcare of any kind.15 The irony is that these
same women are the most likely to suffer unintended pregnancies and
to seek abortions to terminate such pregnancies, which neither public
nor private insurance will cover under the ACA, except in extremely
limited circumstances.16
titles of Public Law 111-148. This Article refers to the two acts collectively as the
ACA, which has become common shorthand for both laws, as they are a functional
unit.
8. See Pear, supra note 3.
9. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception, and the ACA: The
Realignment of Women’s Health, 55 HOW. L. J. 731 (2012) (explaining theoretical
approaches to women’s health and providing context for separating abortion from
other women’s health services with a focus on the ACA’s “amplification” of this
separation); see also Impact of Health Reform on Women’s Access to Coverage and
Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 2012), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/
upload/7987-02.pdf.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
11. Id. § 300gg-12.
12. Id. § 300gg-19a.
13. Id. § 18022.
14. Id. § 300gg-11.
15. Women in urban areas (and in the South and Southwest) have the highest
unintended pregnancy rates. See National Reproductive Health Profile,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/datacenter/profiles/US.jsp (follow
“Pregnancies, Births and Abortions” hyperlink) (last visited July 3, 2013). The
reproductive health issues in urban areas are so pressing that the National Institute
for Reproductive Health started an initiative dubbed the Urban Initiative for
Reproductive Health to focus on the health needs of urban populations. See
generally URB. INITIATIVE FOR REPROD. HEALTH, http://www.urbaninitiative.org/
(last visited July 3, 2013).
16. Section 1303 of the ACA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023, restricts many aspects
of funding for abortion. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18023(a)(1)(A) (private insurers may
cover abortion services as part of essential health benefits when they participate as
“qualifying health plans” in the insurance exchanges); § 18023(a)(1)(B)
(incorporating by reference the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on use of federal
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This limitation may be mitigated by the regulatory determination
as to which preventive services should be covered free of copayment
requirements by insurers.17 The ACA commands that private insurers
must provide coverage of “essential health benefits,” which were to
include certain women’s health services,18 with no required
copayment.19 Working at the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services’ behest, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found
that contraception is an essential health benefit, extending the reach
of the ACA’s access goals to millions of women for whom
contraception was prohibitively expensive.20 Thus, the ACA may
significantly expand coverage for, and use of, contraceptives, thereby
lowering the number of abortions that women of any background will
seek, but especially those for whom rates of abortion have been rising
(the poor, African-Americans, and Latinas).21 This provision is in
jeopardy because secular, private employers have challenged its
constitutionality, claiming that the ACA restricts their exercise of
religious freedom.22
Despite the advance in women’s healthcare that the push for
covering contraceptives represents, treating women’s medical care as
funding for the Department of Health and Human Services to fund abortions except
in cases of threats to the life of the pregnant woman, rape and incest); id. §
18023(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting use of federal tax credits for purchase of insurance
through exchanges for abortions); id. § 18023(a)(2)(B) (prohibiting use of federal
funds for abortion by demanding that health plans segregate of personal funds from
federal funds such as tax credits for the Exchanges).
17. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 1283401 (Feb. 25, 2013).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C) (requiring that the “health care needs of diverse
segments of the population, including women” will be considered in setting the terms
of each of the essential health benefits).
19. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited July 1, 2013).
20. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR
WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 109–16 (2011), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=13181.
21. Unintended Pregnancy Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/index.
htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2013) (citing statistics regarding disparities in unintended
pregnancy rates and abortion rates).
22. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–6294, 2013 WL 3216103
(10th Cir. June 27, 2013); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception
Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012) (providing a succinct
explanation of the issues related to this First Amendment litigation, and explaining
why the so-called contraception mandate is not a violation of anyone’s First
Amendment rights).
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a political trading card diminishes the status of women in the polity
and has retrograde ramifications for their health. Abortion is a
medical procedure, but the political rhetoric of “choice” versus “life”
seems to have co-opted the hard fact that women sometimes need
abortions for medical reasons, and prohibiting access to abortions,
even by the indirect method of funding, ultimately can endanger
women’s lives.23 This is especially true for the low-income women
who rely on Medicaid24 or who will receive the tax subsidies available
for purchasing private insurance in the exchanges (a line that will
undoubtedly be fluid).25 The great paradox of the ACA is that it
creates substantial new obstacles to reproductive health at the same
moment that it attempts to improve access for women’s healthcare.
This Article will scrutinize the separation of abortion from other
aspects of women’s health through the vehicle of the ACA. Part I
will examine briefly why the fragmented nature of American
healthcare has facilitated the separation of abortion from women’s
health, despite the fact that abortion is a medically necessary
procedure for many women. To that end, this Part will explore the
disjointed history of access to medicine juxtaposed against the
strangely non-woman-centric nature of the fundamental rights at play
in reproductive health. Part II will provide an overview of the ACA
to explain the spending elements of the ACA that magnify greatly the
limits on access to abortion in both public and private health
insurance programs. Part III will summarize the jurisprudential
changes resulting from National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius26 and analyze three ways in which NFIB affects women’s
health under the ACA.

23. See B. Jessie Hill, What Is The Meaning of Health? Constitutional
Implications of Defining “Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under
the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445 (2012) (discussing the difficulty of
grounding this problem in constitutional arguments).
24. Some women are already covered by Medicaid by virtue of being pregnant or
being parents. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2012). For childless women,
Medicaid coverage will be available in states that opt in to the ACA’s expansion of
Medicaid as of January 1, 2014. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; see also Rachel Benson Gold,
Insurance Coverage and Abortion Incidence: Information and Misinformation, 13
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4, 9 (2010) (explaining how the expansion of the Hyde
Amendment will affect Medicaid enrollees and especially enrollees in states that
prohibit use of state funds for abortion services).
25. 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
26. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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I. HISTORICAL ANACHRONISMS
The ACA’s reliance on existing fractured finance and delivery
systems facilitated the separation of reproductive care from the
remainder of the law. This Part will consider the role of historical
paths in American healthcare to contextualize how healthcare reform
could exclude a commonly performed, non-experimental medical
procedure from its otherwise patient-protective approach to
healthcare access. It will then review the underlying rights that
should protect women from the ACA’s segregation of reproductive
care. Studying these structural elements of American healthcare
helps to clarify how pre-existing systemic deficiencies facilitated the
amplification of the Hyde Amendment, which will be explored in Part
II.
A. Abortion Is Healthcare
Women’s sexual health is a beacon for political controversy, and
the ACA has been no exception. Therefore, it is important to
highlight this fact: abortion is a form of medical care for women.27
Pregnancies may be terminated either surgically or by oral
medication; both situations require medically trained personnel.28
The medical assistance necessary for abortion both helps to define it
as healthcare for women and increases the complexity of its
regulation, as healthcare providers are licensed by each state in which
they provide medical services and are subject to the special rules that
often attend abortion.29 Abortion may be performed for a number of
27. The 2012 election cycle made this abundantly clear, with federal congressional
and presidential candidates making statements that abortion was never necessary to
save the life of a pregnant woman. See, e.g., Liz Goodwin, Congressman Says
Abortions Never Necessary to Save Life of Mother, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/congressman-says-abortions-never-necessarysave-life-mother-175130900--election.html. Doctors swiftly responded to clarify that
such statements were political, not medical, and that abortion is often medically
required to protect women’s health. Response to Politicians’ Inaccurate Abortion
Comments, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/News_Releases/2012/Response_to_
Politicians_Inaccurate_Abortion_Comments. For example, ectopic pregnancies
occur “in 1 in every 40 to 1 in every 100 pregnancies,” arguably threaten the life of a
pregnant woman, and would be covered by Medicaid. Ectopic Pregnancy, MEDLINE
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000895.htm (last updated
Mar. 22, 2013).
28. Carol Sanger, About Abortion: The Complications of the Category, 54 ARIZ.
L. REV. 849, 852 (2012) (describing the medical nature of abortion).
29. Many of the restrictions on abortion were made possible by the decision in
Casey, discussed further below. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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medical reasons, such as ectopic pregnancy, fetal abnormality, lifeand health-threatening pregnancy-related complications (such as
blood clots), or incomplete spontaneous miscarriage.30
This
recognition was a foundational element of the initial push for
decriminalizing abortion in the 1960s, which came not only from
women’s rights organizations but also from the medical profession.31
Over time, the narrative of women’s medical need for abortion has
been lost both in the law and in the public conversation.32 But the fact
that abortion is a medical procedure, and thus part of the
constellation of women’s healthcare, remains.
Abortion’s medical status is reflected in widespread private
insurance coverage of abortion, relevant here because of the changes
that the ACA has wrought. Prior to the ACA, an estimated eightyseven percent of private insurance plans covered abortion.33 This
coverage is consistent with insurers’ predilection for covering nonexperimental, medically necessary procedures.34 Though Medicaid
generally follows the same pattern, it long has been subject to
political pressures that alter its otherwise comprehensive coverage of
medically necessary care.35 Thus, as will be discussed further below,
Medicaid long has restricted federal funds from being directed to
abortion services.36 This coverage disparity contributes to the ever30. See, e.g., Andreea A. Creanga et al., Trends in Ectopic Pregnancy Mortality in
the United States: 1980–2007, 117 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 837, 837 (2011). The
vast majority of late-term abortions are performed for medical reasons. See Brief of
the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 10–15, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05380, 1382), 2006 WL 2867888 at *17–29.
31. See Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–
75 (1992) (describing Roe’s grounding in the therapeutic concept of abortion).
32. See Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative Interference with the Patient–
Physician Relationship, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557 (2012) (reminding politicians
that medical care does not benefit from political, non-scientific intervention); see also
Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 391–93 (2013) (describing the roots of the abortion
movement in the “therapeutic” need for doctors to provide abortions to women).
33. The data is slightly out of date, but it has not been updated. See Adam
Sonfield et al., U.S. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives and the Impact of
Contraceptive Coverage Mandates, 2002, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 72, 76 (2004).
34. Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992) (discussing health insurers’ role in assessing
which medical procedures are appropriate for payment and thus appropriate for
treatment).
35. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text.
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widening gap in care between poor women and women with financial
resources.
The federal Medicaid payment restriction has pushed many state
courts to consider the place of abortion under state constitutions.
Thus, thirteen states have recognized, as a matter of state
constitutional law, that abortion is a medically necessary procedure
requiring funding for poor women.37 Presented with challenges to
restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions, the courts generally
have held that poor women cannot be forced to suffer healthjeopardizing pregnancies by virtue of the state’s interest in life.38
37. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf (last updated July 1,
2013).
38. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (holding that the
New Jersey state constitution protected poor women’s funding of abortion for
“medically necessary” abortions). The court wrote:
[T]here [is no] fundamental right to funding for an abortion. The right to
choose whether to have an abortion, however, is a fundamental right of all
pregnant women, including those entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for
necessary medical treatment. As to that group of women, the challenged
statute discriminates between those for whom medical care is necessary for
childbirth and those for whom an abortion is medically necessary. Under
[the statute] those needing abortions receive funds only when their lives are
at stake. By granting funds when life is at risk, but withholding them when
health is endangered, the statute denies equal protection to those women
entitled to necessary medical services under Medicaid.
Id. at 934. The court continued,
Although that is a legitimate state interest, at no point in a pregnancy may it
outweigh the superior interest in the life and health of the mother. Yet the
funding restriction gives priority to potential life at the expense of maternal
health. From a different perspective, the statute deprives indigent women
“of a governmental benefit for which they are otherwise eligible, solely
because they have attempted to exercise a constitutional right.”
Id. at 935 (citation omitted); see also Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002). The Simat court wrote:
Refusing abortions and thus preventing administration of the needed
therapy for seriously ill women may promote childbirth and protect the
fetus, but in some cases it will undoubtedly destroy the health and perhaps
eventually the life of the mother. In such a situation, the state is not simply
influencing a woman’s choice but actually conferring the privilege of
treatment on one class and withholding it from another. . . . Surely, a
woman’s right to choose preservation and protection of her health, and
therefore, in many cases, her life, is at least as compelling as the state’s
interest in promoting childbirth. The restrictions in the [Medicaid] funding
scheme thus not only endanger the health of women being treated in their
program but prevent those women from choosing a medical procedure,
abortion, when necessary to preserve their health. . . . given the right of
choice announced in Roe, once the state allows abortion funding if
immediately necessary to save the mother’s life, the state’s interest in
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These decisions often emphasize the medical nature of abortion that
underlies the impermissible distinctions being drawn for poor women
in Medicaid.39
This is not to say that the medical nature of abortion should leave
the decision to have an abortion in a doctor’s hands, or that health
plan coverage of abortion should be limited to so-called “therapeutic”
abortions. Instead, the medical aspect of abortion highlights the
disconnect between the proclaimed goal of providing “basic security”
for healthcare and the reality of the ACA treating abortion as if it
were not a form of healthcare.
B.

The Fragmenting Effect of Stakeholder-Oriented, RightsAbsent Healthcare

America’s medical system developed in a piecemeal fashion that
was often more attuned to its stakeholders than to the medical needs
of patients. This patchwork has been described as “fragmented” or
“disintegrated.”40 Physicians arguably have dominated the discourse
by developing their medical profession into a guild that protected
itself and its political interests, often at the expense of patients and
the development of a coherent healthcare system.41 Every time
politicians or other actors have pushed for developments such as
universal health insurance, or advances in public health, or the
alignment of stakeholder interests through vehicles such as integrated
promoting childbirth cannot be considered sufficiently compelling to justify
refusing to protect the health of a seriously ill woman. . . . Thus, we
conclude that the laws and regulations in question violate the provisions of
article II, § 13 of the Arizona Constitution, which prohibit the enactment of
any law granting any citizen privileges that shall not on the same terms
“equally belong to all citizens.”
Simat, 56 P.3d at 34.
39. See Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection
for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
469, 500–10 (2009) (discussing the themes of the state courts’ decisions regarding
payment for poor women’s abortions).
40. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer Elhague
ed., 2010) (collection of essays describing America’s “fragmented” healthcare system
and prescribing changes to eliminate fragmentation, which the opening essay loosely
defined as “unified decision making”).
Professor Elhague chose the term
“fragmented” to describe the disunity of the American healthcare system because he
sees integration and disintegration as descriptors, not necessarily fraught with
negative connotation, where as “fragmentation” has normatively negative
implications. See id. at 2 n.I.
41. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 2–29
(1982) (introducing and summarizing the book’s premise that physicians have driven
the format of American medicine socially and politically).
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delivery systems, physicians have resisted, very successfully, by
claiming that their autonomy would be jeopardized by any unitary
reform to healthcare delivery.42 Hospitals have also defended their
territory, as have other healthcare industry stakeholders who fear
losing their piece of the pie.43
One way to explain stakeholders’ success in fending off a
philosophically, legally, or pragmatically cogent healthcare system is
that no constitutional right to healthcare exists in the United States.44
Some scholars have argued for such a right through, for example, a
conception of property rights45 or through state constitutions,46 but the
consensus is that no individual right to healthcare exists in the text or
interstices of the United States Constitution.47 This is not to say that a
right to healthcare could not be read into certain clauses or
amendments to the Constitution, but no Supreme Court case has ever

42. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Healthcare Fragmentation,
in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 12 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010)
(describing law as the source of healthcare fragmentation in the United States, laws
that were “at least partly motivated by the interest group power of physicians”); see
also STARR, supra note 41, at 235–89 (describing physicians’ role in preventing a
uniform health insurance system in the United States and staving off other forms of
interest alignment in the American healthcare delivery system). It is hard to say in
the case of the ACA whether physicians “won.” The tradition of deference to
physicians was overridden by political maneuvering, as the AMA opposed the law
and it still passed; and, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
supported access to all kinds of healthcare for women, including abortion, but
abortion has been excluded from the long list of women’s health services that must be
covered by the ACA.
43. See STARR, supra note 41, at 295–310 (discussing hospitals’ resistance to
health insurance and their lobbying efforts to prevent any form of management or
control over their medical autonomy).
44. The exception to this rule is prisoners, for whom it is an Eighth Amendment
violation (cruel and unusual punishment) to withhold medical care. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (“These elementary principles establish the
government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration. . . . We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’
. . . .” (citation omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to
Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 65 (2008) (arguing that “Americans have a property
right to receive medical care”).
46. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the
Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325 (2010) (recognizing the lack of a
federal constitutional right to healthcare and cataloging the various state
constitutional rights to medical care).
47. See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? 25 (2003)
(“[N]owhere in the Constitution is there a hint of a right to health care.”).
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held that a collective or individual right to healthcare exists.48 Though
in the modern era this absence might seem like a gross oversight,
medicine leaned toward barbarism in the late 1700s, and a right to
healthcare would have meant a right to bloodletting and other
dubious practices.49
In addition, at common law, physicians did not have a duty to treat
anyone they did not wish to, unless an existing physician-patient
relationship created an ongoing duty of care.50 One could argue that
federal statutes such as Medicare,51 Medicaid,52 and the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act53 create statutory “rights” to
healthcare, but these are not coherent rights that extend to all
citizens. Though these statutes fill some gaps, they do not cover
enough ground to describe a general right to healthcare.
Stakeholders arguably have had no drive to create a cogent medical
48. But see George J. Annas, A Poor Read on Rights, Rationing, and Racism, 32
HEALTH AFF. 627 (2013), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/32/3/627.full.pdf+html. Refuting the reviewed book’s assertions about
healthcare rationing and rights, Professor Annas asserts a broad-based view of
healthcare “rights”:
The United States does, nonetheless, have all kinds of health care rights:
constitutional rights; statutory rights, which are sometimes called
entitlements; and common-law rights. The only Americans who have a
constitutional right to health care are prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment. . . . Women in the United States have a constitutional right to
birth control and abortion, although not to have them financed. Among the
major statutory entitlements are Medicare; Medicaid; and medical services
for veterans, active-duty military personnel, and Native Americans. The
most important common-law right to health care is the right to treatment in
a hospital emergency department (at least until one’s condition is
stabilized), assuming one can get to the emergency department and is
assessed as having an emergency condition. This right is also a federal
statutory right because of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act of 1986. These are all rights regarding access to health care.
There are also a whole set of rights that individual patients have, sometimes
referred to as “patients’ rights,” once they are under care, including
informed consent, confidentiality, and privacy. And, in this land of liberty,
perhaps the strongest right in health care, and one that is also a
constitutional right, is the right to refuse treatment.

Id.
49. See STARR, supra note 41, at 155–57 (explaining the advent of hygienic
hospital practices and antiseptic surgery followed by aseptic surgery shortly
thereafter).
50. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (holding that doctors have
no duty to treat unless an existing physician-patient relationship creates such an
obligation).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
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system—neither common law nor constitutional law would have
forced them to do so—and only recently have states attempted bold
systemic reforms.54
A constitutional right to medical care would not automatically lead
to coherent healthcare delivery or aligned healthcare provider
interests.55 Certain kinds of patients or procedures, however, can be
separated more easily from the protection of the herd if patients have
no recourse in the Constitution, statutes, or common law. Arguably,
the lack of a right to healthcare has smoothed the path to segregating
one particular medical procedure from the attempt to create a
plenary healthcare coverage scheme.
The strange irony of
segregating abortion is that women do have a protected right to
access abortion by virtue of Roe v. Wade,56 but that right has been
limited over time. Further, the right is theoretical if the care itself is
inaccessible, which is especially true for poor women who do not have
the resources to pay for private care.57
Another aspect of the fragmented healthcare system that facilitates
the separation of one procedure from the treatment of the whole
person is the partition of the poor in public insurance (Medicaid)
from forms of private insurance that historically have been subject to
little government intervention.58 In the next Part, this Article will
discuss the ramifications of abortion restrictions in both public and
private insurance; here, the point is structural rather than substantive.
Divided mechanisms of insurance further fragment healthcare and
make it easier to chip away at certain patients’ coverage. Medicaid
enrollees in particular have been targeted for legislators’ morality
54. An obvious example is Massachusetts, which created universal insurance
coverage in 2006 with “MassCare,” the model for the ACA. See 2006 Mass. Acts 58
(session law creating universal insurance coverage).
55. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document created by the
United Nations in the aftermath of World War II, contains an aspirational “right” to
healthcare in Article 25, which provides: “Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services . . . .” Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948). The United States has never adopted this Declaration. And even
countries that have adopted it do not necessarily have cohesive healthcare access or
delivery.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. All Medicaid enrollees are impoverished and thus unable to pay for private
healthcare. The purpose of the Medicaid Act is to help to mainstream our lowincome citizens into the healthcare system. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (describing
categorical and financial eligibility for Medicaid enrollees).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to1396w-2.
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plays: one classic example was Representative Henry Hyde, who
wanted to prevent all abortions.59 Representative Hyde knew he only
had power over the poor women who relied on Medicaid for their
access to healthcare services.60 Thus, he attached a rider on the
Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) annual budget
that still prevents Medicaid payment for abortion except in extremely
limited circumstances (such as rape, incest, and life endangerment).61
Despite the protected right in Roe v. Wade, poor women could not
stop Congress or the Court from defunding abortion.62
Poor women have no protection from medical segregation. They
do not have a right to healthcare, they do not participate in a program
that most voters contemplate or participate in, and they do not
otherwise have political influence.63 The question that remains is how
the abortion procedure, which is supposed to be protected by the
fundamental right to privacy, can be excluded from the otherwise
universal push for access to healthcare that the ACA embodies.
C.

Non-Woman-Centric Liberties

The legal precedents undergirding the privacy right that protects
access to abortion generally do not protect women as members of the
polity or as patients.64 The failure to recognize the privacy and other
59. 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See infra notes 66–85 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (permitting third party
standing for doctors who treat Medicaid patients because, among other reasons,
Medicaid patients face insurmountable obstacles to getting into federal court, such as
poverty).
64. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged this shaky foundation for women’s access to
abortion in her scathing dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, the 2007 decision that upheld
the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg documented the majority’s
departure from Roe and Casey while at the same time noting the weakness of those
precedents in failing to recognize control over reproductive health as a matter of
equal protection. She wrote:
As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions
is a woman’s “control over her [own] destiny.” “There was a time, not so
long ago,” when women were “regarded as the center of home and family
life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and
independent legal status under the Constitution.” Those views, this Court
made clear in Casey, “are no longer consistent with our understanding of
the family, the individual, or the Constitution.” Women, it is now
acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right “to participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation.” Their ability to realize their full
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rights that protect women’s health as being central to women’s rights
has facilitated fragmentation in women’s healthcare.65 This is a
structural theory regarding the segregation of abortion from the rest
of women’s health, rather than a substantive argument about the
underlying doctrine’s disconnect from women’s rights, and this
framework has facilitated the greatest obstacle to women’s access to
abortion since Harris v. McRae was decided.
Harris v. McRae is the direct progenitor of the ACA’s abortion
restrictions because it upheld the Hyde Amendment’s restriction on
federal funding for abortion.66 The Court reasoned that Congress did
not create the obstacle67 to abortion access because the women
enrolled in Medicaid were impoverished by their own fault, rather
than the fault of the government.68 The federal government,
potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to “their ability to
Thus, legal challenges to undue
control their reproductive lives.”

restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy
to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.
Id. at 171–72 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In so reasoning, Justice Ginsburg
cited some of the most important work on reproductive rights as matters of equality,
which served to underscore her critique of the substantive due process basis for Roe
and Casey’s privacy right. See id. at 172 (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the

Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984)).
65. See generally Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring
Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013) (describing how
Roe’s contextualization of abortion in the medical relationship was useful for
perceiving abortion as part of healthcare and arguing that abortion must be
positioned within a conception of women’s health that the Court has not recognized
recently).
66. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
67. Id. at 315 (“The Hyde Amendment . . . places no governmental obstacle in the
path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of
unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative
activity deemed in the public interest.”).
68. Id. at 316–17. The key passage from Harris is as follows:
But, regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate
her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due
process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman’s
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices. The reason
why was explained in Maher: although government may not place obstacles
in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not
remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather
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therefore, did not improperly restrict access to abortion by refusing to
fund it, despite the unambiguous, targeted testimony that the Hyde
Amendment was designed to prevent poor women from accessing
abortion.69 The Court rejected an individual liberty argument, an
equal protection argument, and a rationality argument that the Hyde
Amendment infringed the rights of poor women and that the federal
government was not asserting a legitimate interest in restricting access
to abortion.70 It is possible that the Harris majority saw this funding
restriction as a small carve-out or a minor funding issue.71 But if the
Court had held that the Hyde Amendment was not a permissible
restriction on abortion, the ACA would look very different. This
federal funding limitation for the small population of women enrolled
in Medicaid in 1980 has become a channel by which, thirty years later,
the ACA restricted funding for both private and public insurance
coverage of abortion without fear of infringing women’s
constitutional rights.
Harris v. McRae sprang from more prominent liberty-protecting
precedent—specifically, the line of Supreme Court decisions
discovering individual fundamental rights that facilitated the Court’s
holding in Roe v. Wade.72 None of this precedent, however, focused
on women as the protected party per se. For example, in 1942, the
Court held that the right to procreate was fundamental to the human
condition and was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the
context for the decision was freedom from unwanted sterilization for

of the woman’s indigency. Although Congress has opted to subsidize
medically necessary services generally, but not certain medically necessary
abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent
woman with at least the same range of choices in deciding whether to obtain
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded
that the Hyde Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected
freedom of choice recognized in Wade.

Id.
69. Representative Hyde stated during the floor debate of the so-called Hyde
Amendment: “I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an
abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the
only vehicle available is the HEW medicaid [sic] bill.” 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Hyde).
70. Harris, 448 U.S. at 324–26.
71. Elsewhere, I evaluated the struthious analysis in Harris as a function of the
“negative versus positive rights” analysis of constitutional rights as well as a function
of the “greater includes the lesser” theory of congressional power. Huberfeld, supra
note 6, at 756–67.
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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prisoners, not a positive right to procreate.73 In 1965, the Court held
in Griswold v. Connecticut that married couples had a right to privacy
in the marital bedroom that encompassed using contraceptives in that
private space.74 This decision arguably resulted from a push by
physicians to treat patients as they saw fit; thus, this holding focused
on the physician-patient relationship rather than women as
autonomous patients.75 In 1972, the Court held in Eisenstadt v. Baird
that unmarried people had a right to be free from criminal
prosecution for purchasing and using contraceptives.76 This decision
hinged on the Equal Protection Clause and the determination that
states could not legitimately distinguish between married and
unmarried users of contraception.77 Again, the context was not
reproductive justice for women. Finally, after being argued in 1971,
the Court issued a physician-centric decision in 1973 in Roe v. Wade,
which held that a right to privacy encompassed the decision to end a
pregnancy.78 Geduldig v. Aiello, decided in 1974, underscored these
opinions when it infamously held that exclusion based on pregnancy
is not sex-based discrimination.79
Although these decisions protected women from governmental
barriers in their healthcare lives, women qua women are absent from
the Court’s analyses. These foundational decisions did not articulate
baseline protections for women as patients making autonomous
decisions, or as members of the citizenry, or as equal political and
economic participants in society.
Undoubtedly, Congress has
detected leeway to impose substantial obstacles to women’s access to

73. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That
Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2010) (explaining the physicians’ right
to treat basis for some early abortion cases, including Griswold).
76. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
77. Id. at 453–54.
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As Linda Greenhouse noted, the Court mentioned the
word “physician” more often than the word “woman” in the Roe opinion. Linda
Greenhouse, Misconceptions, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/misconceptions/ (highlighting, on the
fortieth anniversary of the decision, that women barely appeared in the language or
reasoning of Roe v. Wade).
79. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that California did not impermissibly
discriminate based on sex by excluding disability due to pregnancy from a state
disability fund). As Professor Law has noted, this concept is laughable, but it is very
much of a piece with the Court’s inability to incorporate women’s rights into
decisions that arguably protect women. Law, supra note 64, at 983 (chronicling
critiques of Geduldig).
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abortion.80 Historically, congressional flouting of the privacy right has
existed primarily in Medicaid, though it has extended to other,
smaller programs that enjoy federal funding through either outright
prohibitions on funding abortions, such as for women in the military,
or through conscience clause protections that protect healthcare
providers participating in programs that receive federal funding.81 In
2010, I dubbed these restrictions “pure funding statutes” and
“conscience clause funding statutes.”82 The ACA promotes a much
greater reach for abortion obstacles by amplifying both pure funding
and conscience clause funding laws.83
The concatenated nature of the fundamental rights protecting
women’s access to abortion, in conjunction with the holding in Harris
v. McRae, has facilitated a fracturing of women’s health needs.84 The
ACA divides contraception from abortion in a manner made possible
by a constitutional framework that lacks coherent vectors. Both the
right to use contraception and the right to access abortion hinge on a
constitutional concept of privacy protection, yet the ACA seems to
legitimize only one—contraception—which has been subject to less
litigation but is rooted in the same jurisprudence. If anything, the
abortion right should be more clearly about women’s equal status in
society given the feminist movement that had gained momentum
through litigating state abortion bans by the time Roe was decided.85
The Obama administration appears prepared to make President
Clinton’s famous “safe, legal, and rare” remark about abortion into a

80. But see generally Siegel, supra note 75 (examining the feminist claims to
abortion rights immediately predating the decision in Roe and explaining how the
feminist movement influenced the Court’s 7-2 decision in Roe).
81. See Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 767–81 (discussing two kinds of federal
spending statutes: those that refuse to cover abortion, and those that permit
healthcare providers to recuse themselves from providing abortions, sterilizations,
and other reproductive care services).
82. See id. at 767 (creating the terms described).
83. Pub. L. 111-148 §§ 1303, 10104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023) (prohibiting
payment for abortions with federal funds, requiring segregated private payment for
abortion coverage in health insurance plans in the Exchanges, and enhancing
“provider conscience protections”).
84. Studies have shown that greater levels of unintended pregnancy are linked
with higher incidence of abortion. Thus, the argument that women’s access to
abortion should be protected by the ACA is not an argument that necessarily leads to
more abortion, just safer, earlier abortion in less stressful circumstances. See, e.g.,
Rachel Benson Gold, Insurance Coverage and Abortion Incidence: Information and
Misinformation, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4 (2010).
85. See Siegel, supra note 75, at 1888–96 (tracing the strategies employed by
women’s rights groups to change the focus from doctors’ rights to women’s rights).
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reality. Pregnancy is a surprise to half of American women who learn
they are pregnant, and almost forty percent of those surprise
pregnancies end in abortion.86 Fewer surprise pregnancies by virtue
of greater contraception access surely must mean that fewer women
will seek abortion.87 But this hope does not protect those women who
will still need to access safe, legal abortions for whatever reason,
regardless of their income status. A fragmented system and a
fractured right have made way for the federal government to exclude
one common form of healthcare from all others. No matter how
much access is gained through the ACA, poor women and women of
color will suffer from this federal push to delegitimize abortion
access. Historically, the segregation of abortion has existed primarily
in the world of public insurance, but as of 2014, women in both public
and private insurance plans will be subject to restrictions on funding
of abortion.
II. THE SPENDING AMPLIFICATION
The ACA restricts abortion access by placing limitations on federal
funding for any abortion except those resulting from life
endangerment for the pregnant woman, rape, or incest.88 Such
financial constraints are bound to affect poor women more
dramatically than women of means because they will rely on either
Medicaid or federal tax credits to obtain health insurance coverage,
thereby inextricably linking poor women to limits on abortion.89
Though at first glance it could appear that the application of the Hyde
Amendment to all forms of insurance would not be much different
from its longstanding application to Medicaid, the ACA undoubtedly
aggrandizes the Hyde Amendment.
The following discussion
demonstrates the greater limitations on abortion access initiated by
the ACA for both public and private insurance, at both the federal
and the state level.

86. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (Aug.
2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
87. Gold, supra note 84, at 10.
88. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1303(a)(1)(B)(i) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023(a)(1)(B)(i))
(incorporating by reference the Hyde Amendment, which contains the exception
described).
89. See infra notes 98, 109 and accompanying text. Medicaid will cover all adults
under age 65 up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and those earning 100–400% of
the federal poverty level will receive tax credits for purchasing private health
insurance in Exchanges. Id.
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A. A Quick Tour of the ACA
Despite its ambitious goals, the ACA is not a radical law. It builds
on the existing medical system without shaping American healthcare
into a more philosophically coherent, less fragmented system.90 The
ACA’s crown jewel is arguably that it facilitates a health insurance
home for all Americans.91 The ACA encourages all people legally
residing in the United States to obtain health insurance coverage by
requiring most people to pay a tax penalty for lack of coverage
effective as of tax year 2014.92 The law allows various methods of
compliance with the individual mandate through private health
insurance (employer-based, small group, individual) or public health
insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, veterans’ benefits, federal employee
benefits) and permits limited exceptions for people with religious
objections (such as Christian Scientists).93 An estimated thirty million
new lives will be covered by virtue of the ACA’s insurance reform
implementation.94
In 2011, about fifty-five percent of Americans had access to health
insurance through their employer.95 Those who do not have access to
private health insurance through their employer will be eligible to
purchase private health insurance through health benefit exchanges
(“Exchanges”), which will act as clearinghouses for qualified health
insurance plans to sell small group and individual insurance
products.96 Exchanges can be run either by the state, by the federal

90. PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION 23 (2011) (describing how this round
of healthcare reform negotiations resulted in building on the existing private/public
insurance framework).
91. The first two titles of the ACA as a public law are focused on modifications to
private insurance and public insurance to facilitate access to healthcare, which in the
United States occurs by having health insurance. Pub. L. 111-148, Title I (Quality,
Affordable Health Care for All Americans) & II (Role of Public Programs).
92. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
This requirement (the “individual mandate”) was upheld as a permissible exercise of
Congress’s tax power on June 28, 2012, in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
93. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)).
94. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE
COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20
Estimates.pdf.
95. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 21 (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
96. Pub. L. 111-148 Title I, Part II (Consumer Choices and Insurance
Competition through Health Benefit Exchanges); see also id. § 1312(f) (codified at 42
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government, or by multi-state compacts.97 People whose income is
100% to 400% of the federal poverty level will be eligible to receive a
federal tax credit to cover the premium for purchasing private health
insurance.98 Additionally, insurers that participate in Exchanges must
meet a set of standards that render them “qualified” to offer plans
through Exchanges; one of the more important requirements is
coverage of “essential health benefits.”99
The ACA defines “essential health benefits” to include at least the
items and services that fall within ten specified categories of care:
ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization,
maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse
services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services
and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and
chronic disease management, and pediatric services.100 The essential
health benefits may only be subject to limited cost sharing.101 Insurers
may cover more than the essential health benefits but not less.102
Likewise, states that operate exchanges may require more essential
health benefits to be covered than this list commands—it serves
merely as a starting point.103
The ACA contains many new federal rules for private health
insurance, some of which apply to all private insurers, regardless of
the market(s) in which they operate, and some of which apply only to
those insurers that qualify to participate in exchanges.
One
U.S.C. § 18032(f)) (explaining who is a “qualified individual” for purposes of
purchasing insurance through Exchanges).
97. Pub. L. 111-148 §§ 1311, 1321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041).
98. While the ACA states that people from 100–400% of the federal poverty level
are eligible for tax credits, id. § 1401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 36B(c)), people from
100% to 133% of the federal poverty level are eligible for Medicaid and will not be
eligible to receive the tax credits so long as they are eligible for Medicaid. See 77 Fed.
Reg. 30377 (2012). In response to comments, HHS described that people from 100–
133% of the federal poverty level would typically be eligible for and enrolled in
Medicaid thus not eligible for premium assistance through tax credits, but that some
people will not be eligible for Medicaid and will therefore be able to receive premium
assistance. See id. at 30378, 30387. Thus, the implementing regulations specify that
someone eligible for “Minimum Essential Coverage” through Medicaid would not
qualify for the premium assistance, but that someone ineligible for Medicaid
(perhaps due to state failure to expand Medicaid) would be eligible for premium
assistance. See id. at 30387.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18022 (2012) (defining “qualified health plan” and
“essential health benefits”).
100. Id. § 18022.
101. Id. § 18022(c).
102. Id. § 18022(b)(1).
103. Id. § 18031(d).
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requirement that applies to group and individual insurance issuers,
regardless of participation in exchanges, is coverage of “preventive
health services” as defined by the Preventive Service Task Force.104
This provision falls within the ACA’s Title I requirements that are
designed to “improv[e] coverage” and describes that “[all] group
health plan[s] and . . . health insurance insurer[s] offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall . . . provide coverage for
and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements . . . with respect to
women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . . provided
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the [HRSA].”105 This
rule fits with the prohibition against rating insurance higher for
women (so-called “gender rating”) and with the requirement that
maternity care be covered by plans in Exchanges. All of these new
provisions will “improve coverage.”106
The IOM has followed the ACA’s order to consider the health
needs of women by instructing that certain elements of care for
women should be covered without the copayment typically required
by insurers.107 That list includes prenatal care and testing, testing for
sexually transmitted infections, all Food and Drug Administration
approved forms of contraception and sterilization, domestic violence
screening and treatment, and “at least one well-woman visit” per
year.108 The IOM recommendation, though otherwise comprehensive,
does not and cannot include abortion.
The ACA also expands Medicaid, the program that has provided a
public healthcare safety net for the poor since 1965, to everyone up to

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. § 300gg-13.
Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
See id.
See INST. OF MED. OF

THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES
WOMEN:
CLOSING
THE
GAPS
109–16
(2011),
available
at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13181
(“[r]ecommending
for
consideration as a preventing service for women: the full range of Food and Drug
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and
patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity”); Clinical
Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 2011),
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-PreventiveServices-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf (describing the health
benefits the ACA directs toward women, which include limiting co-payments).
108. Clinical Preventive Services for Women, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 2011),
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-PreventiveServices-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf.

FOR
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133% of the federal poverty level.109 Medicaid is a federal-state
partnership that contains mandatory elements by which states must
abide if they want to receive federal funding.110 Medicaid has long
mandated coverage of pregnant women, women with young children,
and disabled women, but it has never required coverage of nondisabled, non-elderly childless adults.111
The ACA eradicates
longstanding limitations on Medicaid that extended the program to
only the “deserving poor” because Medicaid will cover all adults
under age sixty-five, regardless of reproductive or parental status, by
January 1, 2014.112
B.

Public Insurance

Medicaid covers approximately forty percent of all births in the
United States.113 Historically, medical welfare programs, including
programs that predated Medicaid, have covered pregnant women.114
This set of women has benefited from the access to healthcare that
Medicaid facilitates, and, in fact, pregnant women in particular have
benefited from more generous coverage than other women,115 but
they also have suffered from the limitations that the Hyde
Amendment imposes. Medicaid will now cover another group of
women, childless women under the age of sixty-five, who will gain
access to essential health benefits just like women in the private
insurance exchanges.116 Like pregnant women and mothers, this new

109. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 439–46 (2011) (explaining the entrenched categories of
eligibility in the Medicaid program and predecessor programs).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
113. Issue Brief: 2010 Maternal and Child Health Update: States Make Progress
Towards Improving Systems of Care, NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES 12 (Jan. 19,
2011),
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/MCHUPDATE2010.PDF.
The percentage of births covered by Medicaid in each state varies quite widely. See
id. at 13.
114. Huberfeld, supra note 111, at 438–49 (explaining the historical roots of
Medicaid’s selective coverage).
115. States have the option to expand Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women up
to 185% of the federal poverty level, and many of them do so. See Income Eligibility

Limits for Pregnant Women as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL), January
2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/stateindicator/income-eligibility-fpl-pregnant-women/. As this chart shows, the Children’s
Health Insurance Program allows states to cover pregnant women above 185% of the
federal poverty level. See id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(k).
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group of women will be subject to the Hyde Amendment.117 The
current prediction is that the Medicaid expansion will cover
approximately 4.6 million new women of reproductive age, all of
whom will be subject to this restriction.118
Uninsured women newly enrolled in Medicaid will experience a net
gain in healthcare access, as the ACA creates a new Medicaid
insurance coverage.119 Medicaid has required coverage of pregnant
women, mothers, elderly women, and permanently disabled women,
but not other adult women.120 This limitation and others like it have
facilitated a program that covers children but not their parents, as
parents historically only have been eligible for Medicaid at very low
levels of income.121 Thus, Medicaid has experienced coverage gaps
that affect families, despite well-understood risks for disease spread
among family members,122 and despite understanding that a woman’s
health long before pregnancy can impact the course of a pregnancy.123
Women have been treated as deserving of Medicaid’s assistance to
ensure healthy pregnancies and to reduce infant mortality; the
Medicaid expansion helps to eradicate this limited approach to
women’s health.
On the other hand, in spite of this net gain of access to care, these
newly covered Medicaid enrollees nevertheless will not have access to
one of the most common procedures for women in the United States.
Restrictions on federal funding for abortion procedures are almost as
117. Id. § 18023(b)(1)(B)(i) (referring to the restriction on funding for the
Department of Health and Human Services, which is the Hyde Amendment).
118. Genevieve M. Kenney et al., Opting in to the Medicaid Expansion under the

ACA: Who Are the Uninsured Adults Who Could Gain Health Insurance
Coverage?, URB. INST. (Aug. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412630opting-in-medicaid.pdf.
119. Erin Armstrong, 10 Reasons the Medicaid Expansion Is Good for Women,
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.healthlaw.org/
images/stories/2012_08_13_Reasons_Medicaid_Good_Women.pdf.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). States have also had the option of covering
women and men with breast cancer, women with cervical cancer, and uninsured
women’s family planning services. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII).
121. See Quick Take: Who Benefits from the ACA Medicaid Expansion?, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (June 14, 2012), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/quicktake_aca_
medicaid.cfm.
122. See, e.g., Karla L. Hanson, Is Insurance for Children Enough? The Link
Between Parents’ and Children’s Use of Health Care Revisited, 35 INQUIRY 294
(1998).
123. In the global health context, this is sometimes called the “life-course”
perspective on women’s health. See, e.g., Phyllis Moen et al., Successful Aging: A
Life-Course Perspective on Women’s Multiple Roles and Health, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1612
(1992).
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old as Roe v. Wade.124 As discussed supra, the Hyde Amendment has
attached as an annual rider to HHS funding since 1977, and it limits
Medicaid to paying for abortions when the life of the mother is in
danger (and sometimes in instances of incest, rape, and jeopardized
health, though the breadth of the restriction varies from year to
year).125
Thus, low-income women have had a three-front war in
reproductive health: they have had less money to pay for
contraceptives (despite federal funding for family planning through
Medicaid and Title X) and therefore were more likely to have
unintended pregnancies;126 they are less likely to be able to obtain an
abortion without significant sacrifice because Medicaid almost never
pays for the procedure;127 and few doctors participate in Medicaid,
reducing poor women’s ability to find physicians to provide their
healthcare.128 The ACA helps to address the first problem by
requiring insurers to provide contraceptive coverage for all women.
Arguably, poor women will now have better control over their
reproductive lives, and even states with waivers seemingly will not be
able to require copayments for prescription contraception, as
essential health benefits apply to Medicaid’s expansion population as
well as private health plans in Exchanges.129 The health benefits of
contraception are incontrovertible, and they include not only
prevention of unexpected pregnancy but also such benefits as
pregnancy spacing and further “side” benefits of better economic
status and better educational attainment that attend being able to
control reproductive capacity.130 The ACA helps to rectify the
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
126. In Brief: Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Aug. 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html; see also
Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Determinants of and Disparities in Reproductive Health

Service Use Among Adolescent and Young Adult Women in the United States,
2002–2008, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2 (2012).
127. See Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 741–42 (describing how funding and other
restrictions on abortion “impact low-income women the hardest”).
128. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients,
Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 191 (1995) (explaining how
physician refusal to participate in Medicaid perpetuates a two-tier healthcare system
for people with money and people without).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5) (2012).
130. Comm. on Healthcare for Underserved Women, Benefits to Women of
Medicaid Expansion Through the Affordable Care Act, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (Jan. 2013), http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/
Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Benef
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contraception inaccessibility problem as well as general medical
access problems for poor women.131 The Medicaid expansion will
enable poor women, regardless of their reproductive status, to access
consistent healthcare.
The second front in poor women’s reproductive health is greatly
complicated by the ACA’s amplifications of limitations on federal
funding of abortions in most circumstances.132 More to the point in
the context of public insurance, the ACA not only continues but also
expands the strictures on Medicaid enrollees who need to access
abortion by applying the Hyde Amendment to the expansion
population.133 These restrictions mean that any woman on Medicaid
who needs an abortion will have to pay out of pocket. Women
enrolled in Medicaid by definition are impoverished and cannot
afford the expense without sacrificing other basic necessities, such as
food, shelter, and clothing.134 The Medicaid expansion exacerbates
this aspect of women’s reproductive health struggles.135

its_to_Women_of_Medicaid_Expansion-Affordable_Care_Act; see also Comm. on
Healthcare for Underserved Women, The Uninsured, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (Sept. 2008), http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/
Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/The_
Uninsured.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
132. The federal government’s position on funding abortion is somewhat
mysterious given that a strong majority of the population believes that Roe v. Wade
should not be overturned, as was evidenced by polls on the recent fortieth
anniversary of the decision. See Roe v. Wade at 40: Most Oppose Overturning
Abortion Decision, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/roe-vwade-at-40.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). The report summarizes:
As the 40th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision
approaches, the public remains opposed to completely overturning the
historic ruling on abortion. More than six-in-ten (63%) say they would not
like to see the court completely overturn the Roe v. Wade decision, which
established a woman’s constitutional right to abortion at least in the first
three months of pregnancy. Only about three-in-ten (29%) would like to
see the ruling overturned. These opinions are little changed from surveys
conducted 10 and 20 years ago.

Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)(B)(i) (referring to the restriction on funding for the
Department of Health and Human Services, which is the Hyde Amendment).
134. Heather Boonstra & Adam Sonfield, Rights Without Access: Revisiting
Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y
(Apr. 2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030208.pdf.
135. See Janet Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, The “Other” Within: Health Care
Reform, Class, and the Politics of Reproduction, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 379–
81(2012) (highlighting how limits on reproductive care disproportionately impact
poor women).
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The third front is only minimally helped by the ACA. Some
commentators are concerned that the ACA does not do enough to
facilitate entry of primary care physicians into the healthcare system
in time to accommodate all of the new patients who will be covered
by health insurance and seeking care.136 More specifically in the
Medicaid context, the ACA increased the rates of Medicaid providers
to the same payment levels as Medicare primary care providers for
the years 2013 and 2014.137 The idea was to encourage more
physicians to become Medicaid participating providers by the lure of
the higher reimbursement so that they would be in the system and
ready to accept the expansion population in 2014.138 Unfortunately,
the increase does not extend beyond 2014,139 which makes it unlikely
that the primary care physician shortage will be permanently solved,
especially for Medicaid patients.
This three-front war on low-income women has been limited, for
the most part, to Medicaid enrollees. But the ACA will introduce
these access problems to limited-income women who rely on federal
subsidies to obtain private health insurance. The next section
describes how the ACA greatly increases the scale of limitations on
access to abortion through private insurance.
C.

Private Insurance

Before the ACA was enacted, state law restrictions on private
insurance coverage of abortion were not common, and most people
with employer-sponsored insurance had coverage for the
procedure.140 Nevertheless, a cluster of private insurance restrictions
have existed at the state level. Most notably, a handful of states
prevented private health insurers from providing abortion coverage
through their general policies, meaning plan enrollees had to pay for

136. See Marshall B. Kapp, Conscripted Physician Services and the Public’s
Health, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 414 (2012); Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next
Challenge—Securing Primary Care for Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 364, 493–95 (2011).
137. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, §
1202, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)).
138. See Rene Bowser, The Affordable Care Act and Beyond: Opportunities for
Advancing Health Equity and Social Justice, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 69,
83–84 (2012).
139. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, §
1202, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)).
140. Memo on Private Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan.
19, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/01/19/index.html.
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a separate abortion rider.141 In addition, some states have refused to
allow abortion coverage for state employees.142 Federal law has also
limited privately insured women’s access to abortions through public
insurance coverage restrictions and by allowing healthcare providers
to opt out of performing abortion and sterilization procedures for
reasons of conscience.143
The ACA dramatically changes the visibility of the issue of private
insurance for abortion coverage at both the federal and the state
levels.144 Even though the ACA requires all health insurers to cover
preventive health care for women, and even though maternity care is
specifically listed as an essential health benefit for insurers to cover in
the Exchanges, the ACA directly and indirectly limits private
insurance coverage for abortion. The law pushes private insurance
restrictions much farther than they reached in most states before its
passage by omitting abortion from the definition of essential health
benefits145 and by requiring riders on all of the policies obtained
through the Exchanges regardless of whether they are established by
the federal government or the states.146 This will force insurers to
limit their packages of covered benefits because insurers will not want
to have separate plans for Exchange-based and non-Exchange-based
clientele.147
The ACA specifically excludes abortion from essential health
benefits, both as such benefits are defined and as a gatekeeping
requirement for Exchange participation.148 The original exclusion was

141. See infra notes 155–65 and accompanying text.
142. Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last updated July 1,
2013) (reporting that eighteen states prohibit insurance coverage of abortion for state
employees and providing a chart of all fifty states’ insurance policy limitations).
143. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (the “Church amendment”); 42 U.S.C. § 238n
(the “Danforth Amendment”); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-161, § 508(d)(1), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209 (2007) (the “Weldon Amendment”).
144. See, e.g., Magda Schaler-Hayes et al., Abortion Coverage and Health Reform:
Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based Insurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 323 (2012).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining essential health benefits, which does not include
abortion).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (special rules for abortion coverage in exchanges).
147. Thus far, only one state—Washington—is seriously debating requiring
qualified health plans in Exchanges to cover abortion services. See Jonathan
Kaminsky, Washington State May Mandate Abortion Insurance, BOS. GLOBE, Mar.
24, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/23/wash-state-weighsfirst-abortion-insurance-mandate/7wfHQTMiYiJgWNY4nDZzBL/story.html.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 18023.
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written permissively, indicating that Title I of the ACA did not
require qualified health plans to provide abortion coverage.149 But
the original language was replaced by Title X of the ACA, which
amended the language of Title I significantly.150 Title X provided in
pertinent part, “A State may elect to prohibit abortion coverage in
qualified health plans offered through an Exchange in such State if
such State enacts a law to provide for such prohibition.”151 In other
words, the ACA invited states to pass laws prohibiting coverage of
abortions in Exchanges. The section also permits private insurers to
choose whether to cover abortions while clarifying that essential
health benefits do not include abortions (and therefore insurers need
not cover abortion to participate in Exchanges).152 This section
further restricts payment for abortions by forbidding use of federal
tax credits in Exchanges to pay for abortions, except in circumstances
permitted by the Hyde Amendment.153 Otherwise, the qualifying
health plans are responsible for segregating federal funds from
personal funds, as only personal funds may be used for covering
abortions (except in the instances of rape, incest, and life
endangerment).154
A number of states have forbidden qualifying insurers from
covering abortion, whether or not the state has chosen to construct its
own Exchange.155 This trend reveals that the federal government has
encouraged the states to become bolder in their restrictions on
covering abortion through private insurance. Until 2010, only five
states had enacted laws forbidding private insurers from covering
abortion through general policy provisions: North Dakota,156

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.

Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See id. The state may also repeal such a law.
42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining a qualified health plan for Exchange purposes).
42 U.S.C. § 18023(b).
Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15599 (Mar. 24, 2010), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 18023 app.
155. State Policies in Brief: Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion,
GUTTMACHER, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last
updated July 1, 2013).
156. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-03 (2011) (“No health insurance contracts, plans,
or policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state may provide coverage for
abortions, including the elimination of one or more unborn children in a multifetal
pregnancy, except by an optional rider for which there must be paid an additional
premium. Provided, however, that this section does not apply to the performance of
an abortion necessary to prevent the death of the woman.”).
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Missouri,157 Idaho,158 Kentucky,159 and Oklahoma.160 These laws
prohibited private insurance companies from providing health
insurance coverage for abortions unless the consumer purchased a
separate rider for abortion coverage. These laws appear to have had

157. MO. REV. STAT. § 376.805 (2013). Missouri was the first of these five states to
incorporate a ban against paying for abortions through Exchanges. Thus, the
amended language of the law reads:
1. No health insurance contracts, plans, or policies delivered or issued for
delivery in the state shall provide coverage for elective abortions except by
an optional rider for which there must be paid an additional premium. For
purposes of this section, an “elective abortion” means an abortion for any
reason other than a spontaneous abortion or to prevent the death of the
female upon whom the abortion is performed.
2. Subsection 1 of this section shall be applicable to all contracts, plans or
policies of:
(1) All health insurers subject to this chapter; and
(2) All nonprofit hospital, medical, surgical, dental, and health service
corporations . . . ; and
(3) All health maintenance organizations.
3. No health insurance exchange established within this state or any health
insurance exchange administered by the federal government or its agencies
within this state shall offer health insurance contracts, plans, or policies that
provide coverage for elective abortions, nor shall any health insurance
exchange operating within this state offer coverage for elective abortions
through the purchase of an optional rider . . . .
Id. Notably, Missouri was not the first state to prohibit payment for abortions
through Exchanges. See, e.g., Julian Pecquet, Missouri Fifth State to Opt Out of
Abortion Coverage in State Insurance Exchange, HILL HEALTHWATCH (July 14,
2010,
5:53
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reformimplementation/108849-missouri-fifth-state-to-opt-out-of-abortion-coverage-in-stateinsurance-exchange.
158. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2142 (2013) (“All policies, contracts, plans or
certificates of disability insurance delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in this
state after the effective date of this section shall exclude coverage for elective
abortions. Such exclusion may be waived by endorsement and the payment of a
premium therefor. Availability of such coverage shall be at the option of the
insurance carrier.”). Idaho passed a new law prohibiting abortion coverage in
exchanges on April 1, 2011. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §41-1848 (2013).
159. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.5-160 (West 2012) (“No health insurance contracts,
plans or policies delivered or issued for delivery in the state shall provide coverage
for elective abortions except by an optional rider for which there must be paid an
additional premium. For purposes of this section, an ‘elective abortion’ means an
abortion for any reason other than to preserve the life of the female upon whom the
abortion is performed.”).
160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.2 (2011) (“No health insurance contracts, plans, or
policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state shall provide coverage for
elective abortions except by an optional rider for which there shall be paid an
additional premium.”), repealed by 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 92.
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a deterrent effect, at least to a degree.161 For example, the vice
president of Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Dakota, which
covers approximately eighty percent of North Dakotans, stated that
no member has purchased the insurance rider.162 In Missouri and
Kentucky, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield representatives claimed
that very few citizens are aware of the option to purchase the rider.163
In Idaho, Anthem does not advertise the abortion rider option, and
patients must specifically request it.164 The economics of paying for a
rider are questionable; a woman and her family would be better off
saving for the proverbial rainy day than paying for an actuarially
unfavorable rider. But even if a woman wanted to carry an abortionspecific rider, it appears that private insurers do not offer them in any
meaningful manner.165
The ACA gave state legislation such as this the imprimatur of the
federal government.166 As a result, many more state legislatures have
both proposed and passed separate insurance rider bills across the
country. Prior to the enactment of the ACA in 2010, only the five
states discussed above had passed laws that prohibited private
insurance coverage for abortion.167 But Congress ensured that states
have the option to refuse to permit insurance coverage for abortions
in the newly established Exchanges when it passed the amending,
companion legislation to the ACA.168 Consequently, some of the
states that had abortion coverage limitations prior to the ACA have
expanded the prohibition on insurance coverage to the Exchanges.169
161. See Peter Slevin, Insurers Report on Use of Abortion Riders, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/
AR2010031302139_pf.html.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Schaler-Hayes et al., supra note 144, at 362–63.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1) (2012).
167. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
168. See Schaler-Haynes et al., supra note 144, at 339–44 (detailing the legislative
history of the insurance coverage restrictions in the ACA); see also David
Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Obama Rallies Democrats in Final Push for Health
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/
health/policy/21health.html (describing the prominent role of abortion coverage in
the last push to pass the ACA).
169. Idaho, Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma have introduced or passed
legislation restricting coverage of abortion in state exchanges. See Health Reform
and Abortion Coverage in the Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-reform-and-abortioncoverage.aspx (listing state laws that restrict insurance coverage of abortion in state
exchanges).
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More notably, other states that previously had no such regulations
have proposed bills or enacted laws to that effect.170 As of February 1,
2013, twenty states had enacted laws prohibiting qualified plans in
Exchanges from covering abortion.171
The federal government has signaled that it does not take the
privacy right that protects women’s access to abortions seriously, and
the states are following this example. The ACA has created a federal
structure that allows state lawmakers who desired private insurance
abortion coverage prohibitions to pursue this legislative option more
aggressively. Unsurprisingly, states that are prohibiting abortion
coverage in Exchanges are also prohibiting other kinds of abortion
access. Congress has sent a message that it is not going to protect
women within the reach of federal funding.
III. THE IMPACT OF NFIB V. SEBELIUS
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court decided National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), a high-profile and
controversial decision that upheld the ACA’s requirement for
minimum insurance coverage (the “individual mandate”) as a
permissible exercise of Congress’s power to tax while also holding
that the expansion of Medicaid impermissibly coerced the states into
accepting conditions on federal spending.172 This opinion held for the
first time that Congress’s spending power could be limited by judicial
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment.173 The opening statement of
170. See id. (listing Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin as the states that have enacted legislation
preventing insurance coverage of abortion); see also State Policies in Brief:
Restricting
Insurance
Coverage
of
Abortion,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last updated July 1,
2013).
171. State Policies in Brief: Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf
(last updated July 1, 2013).
172. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012). In the
context of the NFIB opinion, the Court appeared to be concerned with protecting an
individual liberty that can only be described as a right not to purchase health
insurance. Because the Court was concerned with this unrecognized, arguably noncognizable liberty interest, Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent found that the
commerce power does not sufficiently support the enactment of the individual
mandate. Id. at 2590.
173. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
thorough deconstruction of the Medicaid aspect of the decision, see generally Nicole
Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013).

HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1388

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

7/14/2013 10:40 PM

[Vol. XL

Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion makes it clear that Court-enforced
federalism will be central to the decision, describing federalism as a
doctrine that protects the states in the name of individual liberty.174
In the context of the Medicaid expansion, the Court relied on a
more straightforward concept of federalism to police the line between
federal and state power. A plurality of the justices found the
Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally coercive because states
have no real choice but to participate in the proposed expansion.175
The Court held the expansion coercive because the states could not
have anticipated the expansion of Medicaid to all impoverished
citizens when they joined the limited program in 1965; because the
plurality viewed the expansion as a “shift in kind, not degree;” and
because the states could lose all of their Medicaid funding if they
failed to expand their programs to all adults under age sixty-five,
resulting in a deficit too great for the states to make up on their
own.176 The remedy for the ACA’s unconstitutional coercion was to
sever the Secretary of HHS’s authority to withhold all Medicaid
funding from states that refuse to expand their Medicaid programs.177
Thus, no part of the ACA or the Medicaid Act was struck down, but a
mandatory element of the Medicaid program was rendered optional
for the states.178 In other words, states may opt out of the Medicaid
expansion, and the only federal funding they jeopardize is the funding
for the expansion population. They will be able to continue to
participate in the Medicaid program without losing their existing
funding. As I have written elsewhere, the Medicaid analysis suffers
from a number of factual and jurisprudential faults.179
174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (citing New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive
from the diffusion of sovereign power.”)). The opinion emphasizes that federalism
protects individuals, much like Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bond v. United States
and prior opinions that elevated federalism principles. Bond v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2355 (2011) (holding that a criminal defendant may challenge the constitutionality
of the federal statute under which she was convicted by raising Tenth Amendment
concerns with the law).
175. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603, 2608.
176. Id. at 2601–07.
177. Id. at 2607 (ruling that only expansion funding can be withheld if a state opts
out of the Medicaid expansion).
178. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the Court did not rule any
provision of the ACA unconstitutional).
179. See Huberfeld et al., supra note 173, at 46–76; see also Nicole Huberfeld,
Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB), 15 U. PA. J. CONSTL. L.
HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY
43
(2013),
available
at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1657-
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NFIB produced at least three ramifications for women’s healthcare
access. First, NFIB jeopardizes the access to care that our poorest
citizens would receive if states exercise the option to decline the
Medicaid expansion. The Roberts plurality allowed states to opt out
of the Medicaid expansion, which will directly impact women who
would have enrolled in Medicaid in those states.180 A number of
states appear poised to reject the Medicaid expansion and the money
it promises, even though studies consistently indicate that this appears
to be against their economic self-interest. Thus, some women
residing in states that exercise the “Red State Option”181 will have no
insurance access either through Medicaid or the exchanges, because
the ACA only provides federal subsidies to people from 100% to
400% of the federal poverty level. One recent study estimated that as
many as four million women may be excluded from health insurance
coverage due to states opting out of the Medicaid expansion.182 Many
of the women who should be covered by the Medicaid expansion
would be too poor to access private insurance through Exchanges, so
even though they would not be subject to the tax penalty for failure to
be covered by health insurance, they would not gain access to health
insurance, either.
Though on the surface these women appear to face stagnation, data
indicates that they are more likely to experience unintended
pregnancies and more likely to seek abortion to end the
pregnancies.183 Thus, states that opt out of Medicaid expansion may
see more poor women who cannot afford consistent contraception

huberfeld15upajconstlheightscrutiny432013pdf (highlighting the factual faults of the
Roberts opinion).
180. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (restricting the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to withholding funding for the Medicaid
expansion if states choose not to participate in the expansion); see also Huberfeld et
al., supra note 173, at 6 (calling the Court’s remedy to allow states to reject the
Medicaid expansion while keeping their existing Medicaid programs and funding the
“Red State Option”).
181. Huberfeld et al., supra note 173, at 6.
182. Lindsay Rosenthal, Interactive Map: Rejecting Medicaid Expansion Could
Leave 4 Million Women Without Coverage, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 27,
2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2013/02/27/54864/interactivemap-rejecting-medicaid-expansion-could-leave-4-million-women-without-coverage/.
183. See Rachel K. Jones & Megan L. Kavenaugh, Changes in Abortion Rates
Between 2000 and 2008 and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion, 117 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1358 (2011) (describing that abortion rates have dropped overall but
have increased among poor women and women of color); see also Ikemoto, supra
note 9, at 749–52.
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seeking abortions and sacrificing life needs to obtain them. Notably,
the states poised to opt out of the Medicaid expansion are also states
that attempt to limit abortion access the most and that tend to have
the most uninsured women and the highest federal Medicaid match.184
They also tend to have the fewest female legislators.185
Thus, adults who were not covered by their states’ Medicaid
programs prior to the ACA’s enactment will not be saved by the
private insurance subsidies offered to the remaining population,
because some of them will be too poor to qualify for the tax subsidies
that make private insurance affordable in the Exchanges. Although
such women will also be too poor to be penalized for failing to carry
health insurance, the greater problem is that they will have no health
insurance coverage. These poor women will not gain any of the
access to care facilitated by the ACA, and they may become more
likely to seek abortions as a result.
Second, NFIB protects states that reject coverage of abortion in
private insurance, but it also protects states that facilitate insurance
coverage of abortion. The Roberts opinion carefully stated that its
holding regarding the Medicaid expansion was limited to the
expansion and did not implicate other aspects of the ACA.186
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that state sovereignty will be
protected from federal encroachments by exercises of conditional
spending power.187 In the context of abortion under the ACA, this
seems to indicate that states may choose to either limit access to
abortion or facilitate it, and movement in either direction likely
would be protected state exercises of sovereignty pursuant to NFIB.

184. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is Texas, which has the
highest number of uninsured individuals of any state, refuses to create an Exchange,
is loudly protesting the Medicaid expansion, but which also has a very high federal
match for its Medicaid program. See Melissa del Bosque, Rick Perry’s Refusal to
Expand Texas’ Medicaid Program Could Result in Thousands of Deaths, TEX.
OBSERVER (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.texasobserver.org/rick-perrys-refusal-toexpand-texas-medicaid-program-could-result-in-thousands-of-deaths;
Shan
Li,
Protesters March to Urge Texas Gov. Rick Perry to Expand Medicaid, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-medicaid-texas-perry20130306,0,368024.story.
185. Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Eagleton Inst. of Politics, Fact Sheet: Women
in State Legislatures 2013, RUTGERS U. (Apr. 2013), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/
fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/stleg.pdf. The states with the fewest female
legislators, according to this study, are Louisiana, South Carolina, Oklahoma,
Alabama, Utah, West Virginia, Mississippi, Wyoming, Arkansas, and North Dakota.
186. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).
187. Id. at 2601–08.
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The ACA allows states to exclude abortion coverage from private
insurance in exchanges.188 But, it also allows states to continue
covering abortion services if they so choose. Though the ACA acts as
a beacon to state legislatures desiring limits on abortion, it also leaves
the states that have covered abortion in Medicaid, or that otherwise
would allow abortion coverage in Exchanges, to proceed in that
manner as well. Though the number of states that have added private
insurance restrictions on abortion coverage is startling, it is important
to remember that three-fifths of states have not passed such
legislation, and NFIB protects their decision equally.
Third, NFIB opens the door to further litigation regarding the
rights of both states and individuals in the Medicaid program, because
the coercion doctrine is up for grabs.189 One recent example of a state
getting creative with NFIB’s coercion holding can be found in a
Seventh Circuit decision regarding Indiana’s funding of Planned
Parenthood.190 Indiana passed a law that prevented all government
funding, federal or state, from flowing to entities that provided any
abortion services.191
Planned Parenthood and other plaintiffs,
supported by the United States, challenged the law as violating
Medicaid’s “free choice of provider” requirement, which makes it so
that Medicaid enrollees can receive services from any provider willing
to accept Medicaid as reimbursement for services.192 Citing NFIB,
Indiana attempted to assert that it was at risk of losing all of its
Medicaid funding for noncompliance with a term of the Medicaid
Act, but that the provisions of the Act were not federal law with
which the state needed to comply because compliance was voluntary
on the state’s part.193 The Seventh Circuit rejected this coercion
argument, finding that it would be absurd to require the federal
government to comply with the terms of the Medicaid Act but not the
state that voluntarily participates in the Medicaid program.194
188. See supra notes 140–65 and accompanying text.
189. Both Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent refused to articulate a rule
for coercion, leaving its contours to lower court exploration. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus.,
132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
190. See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of
Health, 699 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3557 (May 28,
2013) (No. 12-1159).
191. Id. at 968.
192. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)).
193. Id. at 976–77.
194. Id. The state’s coercion argument was tied to its assertion that the free choice
of provider provision does not give rise to private rights of action under §1983. Id.
The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument as well. Id.
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Indiana’s loss on the coercion theory does not mean more states
will not try similar tactics. Maine has attempted a coercion argument
with regard to the ACA’s maintenance of effort provision,195 and
Massachusetts claimed that the Defense of Marriage Act coerced the
state into accepting a more limited version of marriage than its
citizens desired.196 Other states are sure to follow suit, in the context
of the Medicaid expansion or even the Exchanges, and the
exploration of coercion may lead to a further narrowing of access to
women’s medical care.
CONCLUSION
The ACA reflects a long-standing disconnect in the law by denying
to women the “basic security” of providing insurance for a procedure
that one in three women will need during their reproductive lifetime.
On one hand, the access-enhancing elements of the ACA are likely to
help women, who statistically earn lower wages, need more medical
care, and live longer than men, to gain access to preventive and
regular healthcare and to keep the insurance that they have. On the
other hand, poor women and women of color will lose ground in
access to abortion, because the ACA prevents insurance payment for
abortions through both public and private insurance.197 This new set
of federal funding limits contradicts and undercuts the accessenhancing goals of the ACA. Further, by inviting state lawmakers to
limit insurance coverage of abortion, the ACA amplifies existing
barriers to women’s reproductive care and further detaches abortion
from holistic treatment of women’s medical needs.
The ACA is likely to exacerbate the class divide in abortion
services. Women with private health insurance who historically have
had health plans that cover abortion will likely continue with this
coverage. But the millions of women who will rely on Medicaid and
tax subsidies to pay for private insurance in the Exchanges will be
subjected to the Hyde Amendment with no alternative but to sacrifice
life necessities to access a legal, non-experimental medical procedure.
195. Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12–2059, 2012 WL 4762101 (1st Cir. 2012).
196. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2012).
197. See Emily Spitzer, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe v. Wade: Let’s Start with the
President’s Budget, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:33 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emily-spitzer/hyde-amendmentbudget_b_2506668.html (Director of the National Health Law Program describing
the disparate impact of federal spending decisions on poor women and women of
color).
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The NFIB federalism language provides protection to states that buck
the anti-abortion tenor of the ACA, but it may also protect those
states that have increased their abortion restrictions by preventing
private insurance coverage of abortion.
Whether such state
limitations will give rise to additional access problems remains to be
seen. In the meantime, women’s sexual health remains a political
football.

